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IL ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
A. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Heredia's Claim that He 
Received Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel 
1. Mr. Heredia established an issue of fact as to whether he received effective 
assistance of counsel with respect to entry of his guilty plea 
Mr. Heredia was reluctant to plead guilty to murder but understood from his attorney that 
under the plea agreement he faced a maximum of thirty-five years in prison. R. 358. After the 
change of plea hearing, Mr. Heredia came to understand that the plea agreement involved a 
recommendation for a minimum of thirty-five years and he moved to withdraw his plea. Id. 
Because Mr. lferedia presented an issue of material fact as to whether he was prejudiced by trial 
counsel's failure to ensure that he fully understood the plea agreement, the district comi erred in 
summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
Echoing the findings of the district court, the state asserts that Mr. Heredia failed to 
present non-conclusory evidence that he was coerced by his attorneys. Respondent's Brief, p. 
10-11; Tr. p. 67, ln. 21 - p. 68, In. 3. However, during the hearing on his motion to withdraw his 
plea, 1 Mr. Heredia clarified that he was not asserting his guilty plea was coerced within the legal 
definition of that word and, instead, that he believed he had to respond correctly during the 
change of plea hearing. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. l 44, ln. 15-24. 
The district court also found that Mr. Heredia's assertion that he did not understand the 
tem1s of the plea agreement was contradicted by the record because the district court infonned 
Mr. Heredia of those terms during the plea colloquy. However, the fact that the district court 
1Post-conviction counsel specifically relied on the motion to withdraw guilty pica 
proceedings to establish this claim. Tr. p. 38, ln. 15 - p. 39, In. 5. 
l 
correctly described the terms of the plea agreement in open court does not disprove that Mr. 
Heredia misunderstood those terms. Indeed, Mr. Heredia did not even wait until being sentenced 
to attempt to rectify his misunderstanding and instead moved to withdraw his plea as soon as he 
realized he misunderstood the sentencing recommendations. 
Nor is it that difficult to believe that Mr. Heredia, who is relatively young and lacks any 
legal education,2 understood that the phrase "fixed portion of 35 years" and "cap the fixed 
portion" referred to a sentence of no more than thirty-five years. Also lending credibility to Mr. 
Heredia' s misunderstanding, Mr. Heredia testified that he rejected an offer that his attorn\y had 
conveyed which included a sentencing recommendation of 25 years to life because he did not 
want to agree to a life sentence recommendation. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 80, In. 15-22. Mr. Heredia 
acknowledged that he understood that the judge had the authority to reject the state's 
recommendation and sentence him to life in prison but believed the state was going to ask that he 
spend no more than 35 years in prison. See Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 88, In. 13; p. 89, In. 3; see also p. 
100, In. 13-21 (Mr. Heredia believed his attorney would ask for 10 years and the state would ask 
for 35 years and the judge would decide). Mr. Heredia also clarified that his satisfaction with his 
attorney's performance was based on his belief that the state was going to recommend a 
maximum sentence of35 years. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 98, In. 12-19; p. 102, In. 12-20. 
Moreover, Mr. Heredia had potential defenses to the specific intent element of first-
degree murder, which he would have asserted if he had truly understood the plea agreement. See 
Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 128, In. 4 - p. 130, In. 14. Accordingly, Mr. Heredia established a reasonable 
2 Undersigned counsel can recall several conversations with defendants and their families 
with similar backgrounds to Mr. Heredia's who did not understand the interplay between the 
detern1inate and indeterminate portions of a sentence despite having the issue explained to them. 
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possibility that he would not have pied guilty if his attorney had not convinced him to accept the 
plea agreement without fully explaining its terms. 
The district court also erred in finding that the change of plea hearing established that Mr. 
Heredia had no defenses to first degree murder and that Mr. Heredia's testimony could not be 
reconciled with his assertions on post-conviction. Initially, the district court itself acknowledged 
that Mr. Heredia had potential defenses to first-degree murder but found that those defenses had 
been waived by the guilty plea. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 171, In. 1-3. Additionally, Mr. Heredia's 
testimony at the change of plea hearing can be reconciled with his assertions on his motion to 
withdraw his plea and in the post-conviction action. 
Specifically, Mr. Heredia's testimony established that he was present during the shooting, 
that he knew that the group planned to kill Jessie and that he was not physically forced into 
accompanying them. Tr. (8-9-2007) p. 21, In. 13 - 23. This testimony is not necessarily is 
inconsistent with Mr. Heredia's assertions during post-conviction and on his motion to withdraw 
his guilty plea. Mr. Heredia testified that in December 2006, he was drinking and using 
methamphetamine. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 82, In. 13 - p. 83, In. 2; p. 85, In. 6-10. During a three-day 
period around the 15th of December, Mr. Heredia smoked methamphetamine hourly and drank 
approximately 20 beers each day. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 83, In. 3-13; p. 85, In. 6-10. Mr. Heredia 
became paranoid and began seeing things, including clowns, that did not exist. Tr. (1-31-2008) 
p. 83, In. 19 - p. 84, In. 5; 101, In. 13-17. This information regarding Mr. Heredia's state of mind 
is not inconsistent with the plea colloquy. 
Mr. Heredia also testified that he accompanied the group because he believed the brothers 
would harm him or people he knew ifhe did not. Tr. (1-31-2008) p. 84, In. 18 - p. 85, In. 16; 
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101, In. 20 - 102, In. 8. The fact that no one was actively threatening Mr. Heredia at that time he 
accompanied the group as testified to during the plea hearing does not mean he did not fear 
reprisals at later time if he did not go along. Regardless of whether Mr. Heredia had a true 
coercion defense, his beliefs could have negated that he had a specific intent to aid and abet in 
the murder. 
Mr. Heredia established an issue of fact as to whether trial counsel performed deficiently 
by convincing Mr. Heredia to enter a guilty plea without ensuring that he fully understood the 
tenns of that agreement. But for Mr. Heredia's misunderstanding of the plea agreement, he 
would not have pied guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Accordingly, the district 
court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
2. Polygraph 
Trial counsel failed to explain to Mr. Heredia that the polygraph could be used against 
him and that Mr. Heredia might fail the test even if he was truthful. R. l 4 l-42, 166-68. Because 
Mr. Heredia established an issue of material fact as to whether his attorney's failure to fully 
advise him of the potential ramifications of a polygraph constituted ineffective assistance of 
counsel, the district court erred in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. 
The state, like the district court, contends that Mr. Heredia could not have been 
prejudiced by his attorney's failure to fully explain the risks of the polygraph because he was 
advised of his Miranda rights prior to submitting to the polygraph. However, as explained in Mr. 
Hereclia's Opening Brief, the cursory and general advise accompanying Miranda warnings 
cannot replace the full discussion with counsel regarding the negative ramifications of the 
polygraph that should have taken place. The district court therefore erred in concluding that Mr. 
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Heredia's Miranda waiver precluded prejudice from counsel's performance. 
B. The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Hercdia's Claim that He 
Received Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel 
At the hearing on the state's motion for summary dismissal, Mr. Heredia argued that the 
waiver of his appellate rights did not extend to his right to appeal the district court's decision on 
his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Tr. p. 43, In. 16-22; p. In. 17-23. The district court 
concluded that whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to confer with Mr. Heredia 
regarding the appeal was moot because Mr. Heredia waived his right to appeal in the plea 
agreement and the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal based on that waiver. Tr. p. 71, In. 8 - p. 
72, ln. 9. 
The district court erred in so ruling because an appeal from the denial of the motion to 
withdraw the guilty plea draws into question the guilty plea itself. Thus, the term of the plea 
agreement by which Mr. Heredia agreed to give up his right to appeal should not be construed as 
precluding his ability to appeal the district court's refusal to allow him to withdraw his plea. 
The state's response to this argument is that Mr. Heredia has presented the issue for the 
"first time on appeal." Respondent's Brief, p. 14. However, as described above, Mr. Heredia 
specifically argued to the district court "we are asking the court to consider ... whether or not it 
is reasonable and enforceable, or certainly intended bYthe parties, that that waiver of appeal 
rights would extend to the defendant's right to appeal from the court's denial of his motion to 
withdraw a guilty plea. Tr. p. 43, In. 9-25. 
Accordingly, the state is incorrect in its assertion that Mr. Heredia's argument concerning 
appellate counsel is being raised for the first time on appeal. Further, although Mr. Heredia's 
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arguments at the summary judgment hearing concerning his appellate counsel claim differed 
from the way the issue was presented in the post-conviction relief petition, the state should be 
estopped from objecting to any variance in this appeal. 
As the state correctly notes, Mr. Heredia's amended petition for post-conviction relief 
claims that he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel because counsel did not confer 
with him regarding the issues to be presented on appeal and did not challenge the use of the 
polygraph results in sentencing. However, prior to argument on the state's motion for summary 
judgment, post-conviction counsel informed the district court that there was an error in the 
petition with respect to the appellate counsel claim and: 
I have discussed that error with [the prosecutor]. It accurately sets forth the issue 
for this court's consideration but incorrectly sets forth the issue that was set forth 
in the notice of appeal that went to the Idaho Supreme Court. Specifically, the 
issue that did go up to the Supreme Court was, in fact, whether or not the trial 
court had erred in denying the defendant's motion to set aside or withdraw his 
guilty plea.3 Again, I apologize for that error; but again, we need to make the 
record clear there. 
Tr. p. 13, In. 14-18. 
The state then argued that the appellate counsel claim should be dismissed because the 
appellate court had already held that the appellate waiver justified dismissal of the appeal and, 
thus, "anything appellate counsel did or didn't do or did or didn't add to the list of items to be 
appealed, the state believes is irrelevant by operation of law" and the plea agreement. Id. at p. 
3 As noted in Mr. Heredia' s Opening Brief, the parties representation of the issue 
presented in his direct appeal was inaccurate and a review of this Court's file reveals that the 
only issue presented was whether the district court abused its discretion in sentencing Mr. 
Heredia - an issue squarely precluded by the plea agreement. Appellant's Brief, Docket No. 
35367, filed January 15, 2009. The state then filed a motion to dismiss which appellate counsel 
did not oppose. 
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31, In. 1-25. Post-conviction counsel responded: 
It is clear, as indicated by [the prosecutor], that the petitioner waived his right to 
appeal based upon the plea agreement in this case as well as a recitation of the 
court at the time of the change of plea hearing. What we are asking the court to 
consider is whether or not it is reasonable and enforceable, or certainly intended 
by the parties, that that waiver of appeal rights would extend to the defendant's 
right to appeal from the court's denial of his motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 
Id. at p. 43, In. 9-25. 
Counsel distinguished Mr. Heredia's situation from the typical scenario involving an appellate 
waiver and argued that Mr. Heredia's misunderstanding regarding the terms of the agreement 
was not contemplated when plea agreement was entered. Id. at p. 44-46. Counsel urged: 
And so, again, ... Your Honor, ... the only issue is to the waiver of appellate 
rights as to whether it was the intent of the parties, that it would extend to a 
subsequent motion by the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and essentially 
start over, that is, rescinding the plea agreement, and then from that attempted 
recision of the plea agreement, he attempts to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
Id at p. 4, ln. 16-25. In rebuttal the state reiterated its position that whether appellate counsel 
effectively raised the denial of the motion to withdraw the plea on appeal was irrelevant because 
the Supreme Court had already dismissed the appeal based on the waiver. Id. at p. 55, In. 2-24. 
The state did not object to Mr. Heredia's formulation of the appellate counsel claim or 
point out that the issue was being argued in a different manner than presented in the petition. 
Indeed, it appears that the parties discussed how the issue would be presented prior to the hearing 
and the state then responded to the issue as formulated by Mr. Heredia at the hearing. The state 
cannot participate in presenting a claim to the district court differently then it was formulated in 
the pleadings and then claim that the issue is precluded from consideration on appeal because it 
was not properly presented. See Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 900, 204 P .3d 532, 540 
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(Ct. App. 2009) ("judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one 
position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible position"); see also 
I.R.C.P. 15(b) ("when issues not raised by the pleading are tried by express or implied consent of 
the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings"); State 
v. Norton, 151 Idaho 176,187,254 P.3d 77, 88 (Ct. App. 2011) ("the doctrine of invited error 
applies to estop a party from asserting an error when his or her own conduct induces the 
commission of the error). 
Based on its position in the trial court, the state's incorrect claim that Mr. Heredia's 
argument pertaining to appellate counsel was "not raised below" is not well-taken. The state has 
not offered any response to the substance of Mr. Heredia's arguments and, thus, no reply is 
warranted. 
III. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in Mr. Heredia's Opening Brief, Mr. Heredia 
respectfully asks this Court to reverse the district court's order summarily dismissing his 
application for post-conviction relief and to remand this case to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted this _3 __ day of April, 20 I 
--By Robyn Fyffe 
Attorney for Mr. Fredy Heredia-Juarez 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day of April, 2012, I caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Office of the Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, 
ID 83720-0010. 
Robyn Fyffe 
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